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BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION AND FAVORITISM: THE 
NEED FOR A POLITICAL POWER FACTOR IN RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTION ADJUDICATION 
KARIN JØNCH-CLAUSEN* 
This Article enters the current heated debates on religious ex-
emptions with a modest proposal: political power should be central to 
religious exemption analysis. The Article proposes a factor familiar 
from equal protection law— the Political Power Factor— to be used in 
the adjudication of religious exemptions.  Drawing on recent Supreme 
Court cases, the Article explores how and when political power be-
comes a democratic problem and an Establishment Clause challenge. It 
argues that extra-accommodation of objectors whose views are backed 
by political power in political processes may violate the Establishment 
Clause’s mandate against favoritism of particular religions or religion 
in general. The Political Power Factor is proposed as a tool to adjudi-
cate political power and thereby address the identified Establishment 
Clause concerns. The Political Power Factor gauges the representation 
of the religious objector’s viewpoints in the given polity’s political pro-
cesses. When a viewpoint is well-represented in political processes, the 
factor weighs against granting an exemption, and vice versa. While dif-
ficult boundaries must be drawn, judges can engage in this line of in-
quiry without violating long-standing principles of judicial restraint in 
this area of law. 
The time to engage in a careful political power analysis is now. 
Religious exemptions have been caught in the crossfire of the culture 
wars, and political discourse on the boundaries of the current religious 
exemption regime is polarized. Facilitating boundary-drawing for an 
evolving religious exemption regime is in the interest of both those who 
fear this regime’s rapid expansion and those who are concerned with 
its long-term stability. 
  
 
©2021 Dr. Karin Jønch-Clausen 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current political debate over religious exemptions is conten-
tious and associated with polarizing issues, such as reproductive health 
care and LGBTQ equality. Often the religious exemption case that 
evokes controversy has a certain structure: it features religious objectors 
who seek exemptions on the basis of mainstream beliefs. Two much-
discussed Supreme Court cases provide good examples of this type of 
exemption case:  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission1 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.2 In these cases, the ob-
jectors sought exemptions on the basis of views familiar from—and 
strongly voiced in—democratic deliberation: the opposition to same-
sex-marriage and certain categories of contraceptives.3 Moreover, the 
exemptions requested were perceived by many to be accompanied by 
harms to particular groups: same-sex couples and women.4 
The interaction between religious exemptions and discrimina-
tion, and the general  problem of exemptions resulting in third-party 
harm to particular social groups, has generated substantial academic 
commentary.5  This Article will largely set these heated debates aside 
and focus instead on a related, yet conceptually distinct, aspect of this 
type of exemption:  the democratic and constitutional concerns that arise 
from providing accommodations to the subscribers of mainstream views 
backed by substantial political power. While the general topic of politi-
cal power in religious exemption cases is not new,6 some central ques-
tions remain underexamined: if, when and why is political power prob-
lematic in this area of law, and how should courts adjudicate political 
power?  
Roughly put, the political power concern under scrutiny here is 
the concern that subscribers of viewpoints that have already had their 
fair play in the democratic process are receiving a democratically and 
constitutionally unwarranted privilege. The democratic problem is that 
members of a polity who are already accommodated in democratic de-
cision-making are receiving extra-accommodation under the laws that 
 
1 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
2 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
4 See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Con-
science Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2566–74 (2015). 
5 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2015); Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 4, at 1; JOHN CORVINO, RYAN 
T. ANDERSON & SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 1–2 (Ox-
ford U. Press 2017). 
6 See, e.g., Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 4, at 2520–21. 
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bind other similarly situated members. The constitutional problem that 
follows is that such special treatment may favor particular religious 
views. Such treatment easily violates Establishment Clause mandated 
neutrality. The political power concern explored here is distinct from 
the broader and familiar concern that religious exemptions are demo-
cratically problematic because they privilege religion over other public 
interests.7 The Article assumes that religious exemptions are generally 
justified and focuses on the problems that nonetheless arise from extra-
accommodation of religious views backed by political power. 
The Article argues that a thorough Establishment Clause analy-
sis must include political power considerations, and it suggests that 
courts employ a Political Power Factor when adjudicating religious ex-
emption claims.8 The concept of courts adjudicating political power is 
not new—it is an idea familiar from equal protection law and jurispru-
dence.9 In contrast to equal protection law and its focus on groups, how-
ever, the Political Power Factor as applied in religious exemption adju-
dication gauges the representation of the objector’s viewpoint in 
political processes and deliberation.10 The Article conjectures that in 
failing to employ a Political Power Factor in religious exemption adju-
dication, courts have been distracted by judiciary principles barring 
courts from getting too involved in the assessment of religious claims.11 
It argues that perceived obstacles stemming from this judicial “hands-
off”12 religion approach can be overcome when implementing the Polit-
ical Power Factor. Courts can indeed gauge the relevant forms of polit-
ical power without getting entangled in the resolution of religious ques-
tions and without evaluating the merit of religious claims.  
The discussion set forth here is sensitive to the many important 
yet competing considerations that arise when religion’s role in democ-
racy is at stake. The Article does not reject any of the prevalent justifi-
cations underlying commitments to broader or narrower religious ex-
emption regimes. It assumes that religion at times warrants special 
 
7 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 86 (Harv. U. Press 2007). 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1579, 1579–80 (2017); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1527, 1528–29 (2015). 
10 The Political Power Factor likely will not eschew indeterminacy problems similar to those 
encountered in political power analysis in equal protection law. However, this Article argues 
that the factor likely will provide more transparency and clarity in an area of law that is already 
characterized by indeterminacy and fuzziness. 
11 See infra Section II.B. 
12 See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What are We Talk-
ing About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 837 (2009). 
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treatment. It also assumes that privileging of religion can be problem-
atic, and any perceived privileging requires careful analysis. It is en-
tirely possible to endorse a Political Power Factor without rejecting any 
of these viewpoints.  
I. A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION REGIME  
Religious exemptions have a complex relationship with democ-
racy. One difficulty with religious exemptions is the potential for une-
qual treatment of members of society when certain members are found 
not to be bound by the democratically enacted laws that bind all others.13 
Another concern is that a system of widespread religious exemptions 
from democratically enacted laws would be “courting anarchy” and 
threatening an unstable and unpredictable system of law.14 At the same 
time, the United States is founded on a deep commitment to religious 
liberty and free exercise of religion, commitments that can  be relied on 
in justifying the need to sometimes accommodate its citizens most 
deeply held beliefs.15 
In the provision of religious accommodation, it can be difficult 
to draw the boundary between the protection of religious liberty and the 
democratically unwarranted privileging of religion. Courts have strug-
gled with this difficult boundary-drawing, and the Supreme Court has 
shifted in their decisions between broader and narrower understandings 
of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.16 In addition to consti-
tutional protection of religious exemptions, statutory religious exemp-
tions are constantly evolving and responding to changing times and 
shifting interpretations of religious liberty.17 
 
13 Democratic fairness is a live issue. The issue is at the heart of the debate about the special-
ness of religion. For an overview of this debate, see, for example, Lawrence Sager & Christo-
pher S. Eisgruber, Opinion, Religious Exemptions Can Verge on Favoritism, N.Y. TIMES (May 
9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/09/should-churches-get-tax-
breaks/religious-exemptions-can-verge-on-favoritism. 
14 See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990). Smith has 
been superseded by statute. See infra Section I.B. 
15 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993) (“The 
principle that government in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose 
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights 
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
16 See infra Section I.A. 
17 See infra Section I.B. 
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A. Religious Exemptions and the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses 
First Amendment protections of Free Exercise at the federal 
level have been superseded by statute, and these protections are thus 
currently not as important as they once were.18 Separating constitutional 
and legislative protections is nonetheless helpful in understanding the 
structure of the current religious exemption regime as the different lines 
of analysis are easily conflated.19 In interpreting the mandate of the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause,20 a minimum/floor protection is 
well-settled: A law violates the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause 
when it intentionally targets and discriminates on the basis of religion.21 
Religions and religious observers cannot be singled out for unfavorable 
treatment under the law.22 Yet great deference is granted to legislatures’ 
declared purpose of a given law.23  
From the perspective of the United States Constitution, religious 
exemptions are—roughly put—Free Exercise claims with Establish-
ment Clause constraints.24  The Free Exercise Clause prohibits govern-
ment interference with the individual’s meaningful exercise of reli-
gion,25 while the Establishment Clause prohibits government’s favoring 
of particular religions or religion in general.26 The Supreme Court has 
 
18 The statutory exemption scheme will be discussed in the following section.   
19 Even courts sometimes conflate the two. In Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court faulted the 
District Court for “improperly [importing] a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’ 
First Amendment rights” instead of focusing on the analysis required by the governing federal 
statute. 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). 
20 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion][.]” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
21 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“At 
a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates 
against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken 
for religious reasons”). See also Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018).  
22 See, e.g., Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 542–43 (“[L]aws burdening religious practice 
must be of general applicability… inequality results when a legislature decides that the govern-
mental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a 
religious motivation.”). 
23 See Joseph Liu, The Smith Decision, PEW RSCH. F., (Oct. 24, 2007), https://www.pewfo-
rum.org/2007/10/24/a-delicate-balance6/. 
24 See infra note 32. 
25 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion][.]” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
26  Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”); see, e.g., Lar-
son v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244  (1982) (“The clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”); 
McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“When the government acts 
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acknowledged that tensions exist between the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause, and it has recognized that often it may not be 
“possible to promote the former without offending the latter.”27 
While the Establishment Clause mandates “government neutral-
ity between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreli-
gion,”28 determining the meaning and boundaries of the required neu-
trality has proved difficult.29  As Justice O’Connor once noted, “[i]t is 
difficult to square any notion of ‘complete neutrality’. . . with the man-
date of the Free Exercise Clause that government must sometimes ex-
empt a religious observer from an otherwise generally applicable obli-
gation.”30 When religious beliefs are singled out for special protection, 
the government in providing such an exemption is not being neutral in 
any strict sense of the term. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence rejects 
has rejected inflexible interpretations of neutrality and has rather em-
braced an interpretation of neutrality that is in tune to the unique ways 
that religious adherents and beliefs are situated.31 The idea behind this 
broader understanding of neutrality is that people and institutions may 
at times be uniquely situated and uniquely disadvantaged in ways that 
warrants correcting.32It is by no means clear when a member of society 
is situated in a way that warrants correction through exemption. The 
boundaries between correcting unique burdens and favoring particular 
religions are fuzzy. Exemptions may run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause if providing the exemption results in religious imposition on the 
unwilling, if providing the exemption can be interpreted to result in the 
 
with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Es-
tablishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the gov-
ernment’s ostensible object is to take sides.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) 
(“[T]he 
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”). 
27 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973). 
28 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 
29 See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013) 
(discussing the benefits of “religious neutrality”). 
30 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
31 See e.g. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031 (2017) 
(“This space between the two Clauses gives government some room to recognize the unique 
status of religious entities and to single them out on that basis for exclusion from otherwise 
generally applicable laws”) 
32 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment,13 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 341, 345–46 (1999). 
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favoring of a particular religion, or if the provision of the exemption 
imposes burdens or harms on third parties.33  
The interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as relevant to ex-
emptions was once much broader than it is today. In the 1963 case, Sher-
bert v. Verner, the Supreme Court held that denying unemployment ben-
efits to a  Seventh Day Adventist who, for religious reasons, refused to 
accept employment that required her to work on her Saturday Sabbath 
violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.34  In deciding 
Sherbert, the Court employed what has come to be known as the Sher-
bert test.35  The Sherbert test is a balancing test which requires substan-
tial burdens on the free exercise of religion to be justified by a compel-
ling state interest.36 
 In the 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith, the Court took 
a big step back from this broad understanding of the Free Exercise 
Clause.37 In Smith, the religious objectors were two Native American 
drug rehabilitation counselors who were fired from their jobs due to 
their ingesting peyote at a religious ceremony in their member church.38 
In adjudicating the objectors’ exemption claim, the Court limited the 
scope of the Sherbert test to apply only to laws that already harbor ex-
emption options.39 The Smith Court held that laws could indeed signifi-
cantly burden religious practices so long as they were “neutral and gen-
erally applicable,” i.e., so long as they did not target or purposely 
discriminate against any religion.40 
The plaintiffs in Smith in many ways represented the paradigm 
case of the religious objector in need of protection.41 First, the objectors 
were minorities who could not be considered to have much of a chance 
affecting the laws that bind them.42 Second, the objectors were signifi-
cantly burdened by the law in question which made the intentional 
 
33  In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Justice Burger cited Judge Learned Hand in holding that 
the First Amendment ”gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests others 
must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities.” 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting 
Otten v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d. Cir. 1953)). In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court 
noted that “courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may 
impose on non-beneficiaries.” 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). 
34 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
35 See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990). 
36 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 407. 
37 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. 
38 Id. at 874. 
39 Id. at 890. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
42 See Liu, supra note 24.  
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possession of peyote a crime.43  The law made it impossible for the coun-
selors to engage in a practice central to their religion without serious 
repercussions.44 Finally, the third-party harm involved in granting the 
exemption (i.e., the third-party harm involved in granting the unemploy-
ment benefits) would be rather attenuated.45 Yet, the Court’s majority 
found that the law burdening the religious objectors was “neutral” and 
“generally applicable . . .” and that the exemption could be denied on 
this basis alone.46  This narrow First Amendment interpretation was im-
mediately controversial47 and ultimately resulted in legislative interven-
tion.48 
B. Statutory Protections 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)49 was imple-
mented in 1993 by the Clinton administration in response to the per-
ceived harshness of Smith.50 The RFRA reinstated—and in some ways 
expanded—the Sherbert test.51 RFRA states that the government may 
only substantially burden the free exercise of religion when acting in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest and when the govern-
ment has used the least restrictive means in pursuing that interest.52 In 
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as un-
constitutional as applied to the states.53 As a response to Flores, a unan-
imous Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
 
43 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (discussing criminality of peyote). 
44 Id. at 903 (O’Connor J., concurring). 
45 Id. at 918 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the possibility for the State to grant peyote 
exemption). 
46 Id. at 890 (majority opinion). 
47 See Liu, supra note 24.  
48 See State Court and Legislative Responses to the Smith Decision, PEW RSCH. F., (Oct 24, 
2007). 
49 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
50 See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 163, 163–64 (2016). 
51 It is arguably even a broader protection than that offered under the Sherbert test which does 
not include the “least restrictive means” language. See JOHN CORVINO, RYAN T. ANDERSON & 
SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION (2017). 
52  See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). In full RFRA 
states that: IN GENERAL. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of reli-
gion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in sub-
section (b). EXCEPTION. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person–(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest. Id.  
53 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
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Persons Act (RLUIP) in which the RFRA/Sherbert test was enacted as 
applied to local land-use laws, zoning laws and confined institutions.54 
While RFRA following Flores only applies to federal law, many states 
have implemented their own versions of RFRA.55 The current religious 
exemption regime is thus comprised of a broad statutory basis for reli-
gious exemptions at both state and federal levels, a narrower federal 
constitutional basis resting on Smith analysis, and various levels of state 
constitutional protections—the majority of which provide broader pro-
tections than those set forth in Smith. 
When Smith was decided, it was perceived by many as being too 
harsh on religious observers.56 Both religious organizations and civil 
rights groups protested the decision.57 The federal RFRA that was en-
acted as a response to Smith was passed by a unanimous house and an 
almost unanimous senate.58 Today, the RFRA and its state analogs are 
more controversial, especially when employed in ways perceived to fa-
cilitate discrimination against LGBTQ communities.59 Yet both the fed-
eral and state RFRAs have also played an important part in protecting 
politically vulnerable religious minorities,60 a protection that is not se-
cured under First Amendment analysis governed by Smith.61 Smith anal-
ysis focuses on the law’s purpose and pays little attention to the burdens 
placed on religious observers or the opportunities for religious observers 
to have their beliefs heard by lawmakers in their communities.62 
II. POLITICAL POWER IN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CASES: 
DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
The backlash against the ruling in Smith is quite understandable. 
The protection of vulnerable religious viewpoints and practices har-
bored in the prior balancing-test was unapologetically eradicated. The 
problems associated with such eradication was noted in Justice 
 
54 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–274, § 3, 
114 Stat. 803, 804 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1)). 
55 See Lund, supra note 51, at 165. 
56 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu et. al., A Delicate Balance: The Free Exercise Clause and the Supreme 
Court, PEW F. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE 12 (Oct. 2007), http://www.pewfo-
rum.org/files/2007/10/free-exercise-I.pdf.  
57 Id. 
58 See 139 CONG. REC. H8713 (1993), 139 CONG. REC. S14471 (1993), Senate Roll Call 
Vote No. 331, 103d Cong. (1993) (RFRA was passed with a 97-3 vote in the Senate). 
59 See, e.g., Louise Melling, ACLU: Why we can no longer support the federal ‘religious free-
dom’ law, WASH. POST, Jun. 25, 2015. 
60 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 51, at 165–67. 
61 See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–85 (1990). 
62 See id. at 884–86, 89 n.5. 
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O’Connor’s concurrence.63 While Justice O’Connor joined the majority 
in the judgment, she disagreed with the complete abolishment of the 
Sherbert test, and she wrote separately to criticize the Court’s sharp de-
parture from First Amendment jurisprudence. 64 In her concurring opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor emphasized the First Amendment’s crucial role 
in protecting objectors whose views or practices do not have adequate 
representation in the  political process.65 
 
[T]he Court today suggests that the disfavoring of minor-
ity religions is an “unavoidable consequence” under our 
system of government, and that accommodation of such 
religions must be left to the political process . . . In my 
view, however, the First Amendment was enacted pre-
cisely to protect the rights of those whose religious prac-
tices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed 
with hostility.66 
In the Smith majority analysis, a compelling government interest 
need not be shown at all for laws to impose burdens on religion.67 As 
long as the law is generally applicable—in not targeting religion—it will 
pass muster.68  Observers of minority religions that do not have political 
power stand to lose under such a framework.69  Such groups lack power 
in terms of quantitative representation. They do not have the numbers 
to oust or pressure legislators, and legislators have little political incen-
tive to accommodate beliefs and practices that the majority of their con-
stituency do not approve of. They also lack power in terms of qualitative 
representation. Unfamiliar religious practices or beliefs are easily over-
looked and disregarded in lawmaking.   
RFRA and RLUIP blew life into religious liberty by reinstating 
the kinds of minority protections that were stripped away in Smith.70  
 
63 See id. at 891–95 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
64 See id. at 903–07. 
65 See id. at 902–03. 
66 Id. 
67 Smith, 494 U.S. at 902. 
68 Id. 
69 Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, acknowledged this consequence. See id. at 
890 (“It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoid-
able consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against 
the centrality of all religious beliefs.”). 
70 See Lund, supra note 51, at 163–64. 
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However, protection for politically vulnerable minorities endorsed by 
O’Connor in the quote above is not at all reflected in a RFRA case like 
Hobby Lobby.71 Unlike objectors like the Native Americans in Smith or 
the Seventh Day Adventist in Sherbert, the views in question in Hobby 
Lobby were neither unfamiliar nor disadvantaged in political delibera-
tion.72 The view at stake concerned contraceptives, in particular the cov-
erage of certain contraceptives in employee insurance plans.73  The reli-
gious objectors in Hobby Lobby were evangelical Christians, one of the 
largest Christian subgroups in the United States74 and a subgroup that 
often finds itself at the center of high-stakes political battles.75 Evangel-
ical Christians have had a strong influence on democratic discourse 
about contraceptives.76 Long before the enactment of the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),  contraceptives as abortifacients was a political issue 
that was part of political discourse.77 Evangelical Christians wary of cer-
tain contraceptives were able to voice their concerns in this discourse 
and to influence laws and policies in reproductive health care through 
democratic processes.78  The power that this group has in affecting re-
productive health care law became even more evident after the Hobby 
Lobby decision.79 The Trump administration relied heavily on Evangel-
ical Christian advisors.80 With the help of such advisors, it indeed acted 
directly on the contraception concern at stake in Hobby Lobby, issuing 
 
71 Note that Hobby Lobby was a statutory exemption case while Smith was a constitutional 
exemption case. This is a significant difference, but not for the purposes of this section. 
72 PEW RSCH. CTR., America’s Changing Religious Landscape 3 (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/ 2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape. 
73 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014). 
74 PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 3 (2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/ 2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape.  
75 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dias, Democrats (Wistfully) Take Aim at a Republican Stronghold: 
Evangelicals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/us/poli-
tics/democrats-progessive-evangelical-election.html. 
76 See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Religion and Right-Wing Politics: How Evangelicals Reshaped 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/religion-poli-
tics-evangelicals.html. 
77 See, e.g., Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES (MAY 7, 2006),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/magazine/07contraception.html. 
78 See Lerone A. Martin, Assoc. Professor at Washington Univ., Remarks at Evangelicalism 
and Politics with the American Historian (transcript available at https://www.oah.org/tah/is-
sues/2018/november/evangelicalism-and-politics/). 
79 See John Fea, Professor at Messiah Coll., Remarks at Evangelicalism and Politics with 
the American Historian (transcript available at https://www.oah.org/tah/issues/2018/novem-
ber/evangelicalism-and-politics/). 
80 Noah Weiland, Evangelicals, Having Backed Trump Find White House “Front Door is 
Open,” N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/07/us/politics/trump-
evangelicals-national-prayer-breakfast.html. 
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federal regulations to make it easier for employers to seek religious ex-
emptions from the ACA’s contraceptive mandate.81  
The exemption sought in Masterpiece Cakeshop was likewise 
based on beliefs well-represented in democratic politics, namely the op-
position to same-sex-marriage.82 The same-sex marriage debate was a 
politically hot issue both prior to and following the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.83 The extensive debates in media, aca-
demic journals, courts room and legislative debates etc. provided ample 
opportunity for those who oppose same-sex marriage to make their 
views and rationales known.84 The religious objectors in both Hobby 
Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop could thus be said to seek exemptions 
on the basis of views backed by significant political power, and the pro-
tection provided by RFRA starts to look like privileging and extra-ac-
commodation.85 
A. Exemptions for Politically Powerful Objectors: Establishment 
Clause Challenges 
Privileging certain religions or religious viewpoints through ex-
tra-accommodation is hard to justify. Meaningful Free Exercise protec-
tions may demand that the state remove the burden that a law places on 
religious observers, however, privileged treatment of religious view-
points backed by political power can raise Establishment Clause con-
cerns.  A balancing of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause demands 
requires an “on the ground” analysis of how the religious observer is 
situated with respect to the law in question.86 Political power is a key 
component of this analysis.87 
The Establishment Clause prohibits state favoring of any partic-
ular religion.88 A clear yet flexible mandate of state neutrality flows 
from this prohibition. The flexibility pertains to what the Supreme Court 
 
81 See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Ser-
vices Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536, 57,537 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be cod-
ified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
82 Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1581–
82 (2017). 
83 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
84 See infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
85 Travis Gasper, A Religious Right to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious Freedom” 
as a Threat to the LGBT Community, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 395, 412 (2015). 
86 See Leslie, supra note 83, at 1595. 
87 See Leslie, supra note 83, at 1595–96. 
88 See U.S. CONST., amend. I., supra note 21. 
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has called “benevolent neutrality,”89 which allows for religion to be 
taken into account when providing accommodations to secure meaning-
ful religious liberty.90  In providing such accommodation, the mandate 
of neutrality is obeyed if the exemption is correcting for a disadvantage 
rather than creating a privilege, i.e., when neutrality is interpreted in 
ways that are in tune to the unique ways that religious adherents and 
beliefs are situated.91   
Would an exemption based on views backed by political power 
lean toward unfair privileging or is the exemption rather correcting a 
unique disadvantage that the objector faces? The Establishment Clause 
demands an answer to this important question in religious exemption 
adjudication. It is hard to argue that objectors like the ones in Hobby 
Lobby or Masterpiece Cakeshop were uniquely disadvantaged in ways 
that warrant correcting. The objectors’ viewpoints on same-sex mar-
riage and contraceptives were well-represented in democratic politics.92 
Of course, any member of society on the losing side of a political issue 
is disadvantaged with regard to the law that reflects the winning side of 
the underlying disagreement. However, the objectors in these cases do 
not face a unique disadvantage when compared to other members of so-
ciety who oppose the law in question.93 By contrast, the Native Ameri-
can counselors in Smith subscribed to practices that were likely unfa-
miliar to the legislators behind the law in question, and they likely did 
not have any means of making their concerns heard.94 In this way, the 
counselors were uniquely situated with respect to the law in question. 
Those who believe that religious exemptions should be granted 
primarily because religious beliefs are special may have their red flags 
up at this point. From this perspective, one may ask: can religious ob-
jectors not be uniquely situated simply by virtue of the religiosity of 
their beliefs—even if the viewpoints at stake have had a fair representa-
tion in the political process? The short answer is yes. The fact that we 
have religious exemptions at all reflects a societal sensitivity to the 
 
89 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (“[T]here is ample room under the Es-
tablishment Clause for benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist with-
out sponsorship and without interference.”). 
90 See id. at 705–06 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 
136, 144–45 (1987) (“[G]overnment may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious prac-
tices and . . . may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.”)).  
91 See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705. 
92 Gasper, supra note 86. 
93 See Weiland, supra note 81. 
94 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 919–20 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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beliefs and practices that arise out of religion broadly defined. 95 This 
Article does not argue that there is no time or place for accommodation 
of religious views that are backed by political power. The Political 
Power factor is merely a factor, it by no means exhausts the inquiry into 
when an objector is uniquely situated. The more modest proposal is that 
the Political Power Factor weighs against such claims and provides 
some clarity to Establishment Clause analysis. Other factors and con-
cerns may weigh in favor of a given exemption.   
B. Boundaries in Courts’ Adjudication of Religious Claims: The 
Religious Question Doctrine 
The challenges that courts face in adjudicating religious exemp-
tion claims go beyond the balancing of competing justifications and un-
derstandings of religious liberty. The subject matter itself creates diffi-
culties. Adjudicating religious claims is so fraught with potential 
problems that courts have adopted an adjudicatory hands-off approach: 
The Religious Question Doctrine.96 The Religious Question Doctrine 
bars courts from resolving religious questions or evaluating the merit of 
religious claims or practices.97 
Several rationales underlie the Religious Question Doctrine. 
First, courts are believed to lack competence in answering religious 
questions. 98 The general idea behind the competence rationale is that 
religious questions often turn on metaphysical or spiritual commitments 
that escape reasoned analysis.99 Second, when courts adjudicate reli-
gious claims, neutrality may be jeopardized.100 Judges, like other human 
 
95 Some commentators argue that this sensitivity should be eradicated—i.e., that religious be-
liefs should be treated on par with any other ethical or moral concerns. See, e.g., Eisgruber & 
Sager, supra note 13. As previously mentioned, this Article does not take this position. 
96 See Garnett, supra note 12. 
97 See Michael A. Helfand, When Judges Are Theologians: Adjudicating Religious Questions, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND RELIGION 262, 263 (Rex Ahdar ed., 2018).   
98 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not within the judicial 
function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more 
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 821 (1983) (“[I]n this case, we are faced 
with potential religious objections to an activity at the very center of religious life, and it is 
simply beyond the competence of government, and inconsistent with our conceptions of liberty, 
for the state to take upon itself the role of ecclesiastical arbiter.”). See also Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes between Religious Institutions and 
Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 144 (2009). 
99 For a discussion of this rationale and its shortcomings, see Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a 
“Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 
54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 533 (2005). 
100 See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 134–35. 
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beings, are subject to cognitive biases and may be more understanding 
of claims from familiar majority religions or the religions to which they 
belong.101 The Religious Question Doctrine counters the arbitrary out-
comes that arise when such cognitive biases shape judicial decision-
making, and it functions as a tool to secure the neutrality required by the 
Establishment Clause.102  Finally, the primary concern with courts re-
solving religious questions or assessing the merits of religious claims is 
their lack of authority in the religious realm.103 As legal scholar Richard 
Garnett phrases it: “secular authorities lack the power to answer some 
questions—religious questions—whose resolution is, under an appro-
priately pluralistic political theory, left to other institutions.”104 Accord-
ing to this rationale, whether courts are capable or not, whether the par-
ties in a given dispute consent or not,105 it is improper for courts to seek 
to resolve religious questions.106 Again this rationale has its underpin-
nings in the Establishment Clause and the concern that resolving reli-
gious questions can be perceived as endorsement of certain religions or 
particular religious viewpoints.107 
Courts will go far in their adherence to the Religious Question 
Doctrine.” 108 The Hobby Lobby case provides a good example of a strik-
ingly broad interpretation of the Religious Question Doctrine.109 In the 
wake of Hobby Lobby, many commentators were concerned about the 
almost absolute deference that was given to the objectors in determining 
the degree of the burden that the law placed on their free exercise of 
religion.110 The majority in Hobby Lobby deferred to the objectors’ own 
evaluation of the extent to which the contraceptive mandate burdened 
their religious beliefs, i.e., on whether the objectors  were substantially 
burdened by the law  as required by RFRA.111 In the majority opinion, 
Justice Alito asserted that it is “not up for us to say that [the objectors’] 
 
101 See MARTHA MINNOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 50–52, (1990). 
102 See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 137. 
103 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 145. 
104 Garnett, supra note 12, at 861. 
105 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 48.   
106 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at 48.   
107 See Helfand, supra note 98, at 495. 
108 The term “Religious Question Doctrine” is coined by scholars. It is not a term that is used 
by courts. Scholars also sometimes refer to the doctrine as the “hands-off” approach. See, e.g., 
Garnett, supra note 12; Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Reli-
gious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009). 
109 See Alex J. Luchenister, A New Era of Inequality: Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions 
from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 65 (2015). 
110 Id. at 67–68. 
111 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726 (2014). 
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beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial”.112  The majority in Hobby Lobby 
also left unquestioned the objectors’ views on the workings of contra-
ceptives, disregarding broadly accepted scientific findings.113 Further, 
the sincerity of the objectors was never examined, but rather taken for 
granted.114 
In sum, courts are tremendously wary about subjecting religious 
claims to basically any form of inquiry. Adherence to the Religious 
Question Doctrine has led courts to refrain from questioning the objec-
tor’s sincerity, the factual basis of the objector’s claims, and the sub-
stantiality of the purported burden.115 This Article will not engage in the 
academic discussion on whether and when resistance to these various 
forms of inquiry is warranted. Instead, it argues that whatever other lim-
itations the Religious Question Doctrine may set, it does not bar the in-
quiry set forth by the Political Power Factor.116  
III. A POLITICAL POWER FACTOR IN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION 
ADJUDICATION  
The Political Power Factor is a device that could counter some 
of the democratic and constitutional concerns associated with religious 
exemptions. The Political Power Factor evaluates the status of a belief 
on a scale between unfamiliar/disadvantaged and familiar/well-repre-
sented in democratic discourse. Under RFRA analysis, the political 
power can be rolled into the substantial burden analysis. Recall that the 
RFRA adopts a strict scrutiny form of analysis, a law can only place a 
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion if such a burden is 
justified by a compelling government interest, and the government has 
used the least restrictive means in pursuing that interest.117 The Political 
 
112 Id. at 725. 
113 See Meredith R. Mandell, When Religious Belief Becomes Scientific Opinion: Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby and the Unraveling of Federal Rule 702, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 92, 93 (2016). 
114 The Court did discuss whether corporations could have sincere beliefs, and it concluded 
that a closely held corporation like Hobby Lobby could. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717. 
While sincerity technically is a requirement to be met by religious objectors to prevail on their 
exemption claim, confusion exists on whether it can be adjudicated without trespassing into 
religious territory. 
115 See supra Section II.B. 
116 See infra Section IV. 
117 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).  
IN GENERAL. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even 
if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 
EXCEPTION. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
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Power Factor can play a part in determining substantiality. The idea is 
that burden analysis need not only be about the ways in which the law 
affects the lives of the objectors, but also the extent to which the demo-
cratic processes underling the law are responsive to the objector as a 
constituent of the polity in which the law is binding. If the objector did 
not have a chance of having her voice heard in the deliberation preced-
ing the law’s passing, and she likewise will not have a chance of having 
her voice heard on the subject of concern going forward, she is loosely 
put more burdened by the law than the constituent whose views have 
had and will have a chance of being heard. For example, as previously 
noted, the objectors concern with certain contraceptives in Hobby 
Lobby, is recognizable as a political viewpoint that has been part of the 
democratic discourse for quite some time.118 It is a position that has 
played a fairly prominent role in the politics of reproductive health care 
and that has been backed by significant political power.119 On the basis 
of these considerations, the Political Power Factor would weigh against 
a finding of substantiality. 
By contrast, if we employ the Political Power Factor to the facts 
of Sherbert v. Verner,120 the factor would weigh in favor of finding sub-
stantiality. The Seventh Day Adventist who would not work on Satur-
days for religious reasons likely did not have a plausible avenue for 
voicing her concerns in relevant political deliberations.  We can assume 
that the religious belief in question was unfamiliar, and due to the prom-
inence of religious observers who would consider Sunday the day of 
rest, it may also have been an unpopular belief in her polity. The oppor-
tunity for her to voice her concerns in political deliberation was there-
fore minimal to non-existent. As such, she carries a powerlessness bur-
den that is not carried by the constituent who had or has a fair play in 
politics.  Put in Establishment Clause terms, on the basis of her religious 
views that lack political power, she is uniquely situated in ways that 
justify correcting.  
When making these determinations, courts would use their com-
mon knowledge of public political culture. In fact, courts are often in 
the position of gauging political culture and public sentiment. Examples 
of such gauging is found in cruel and unusual punishment cases where 
courts will engage in questions such as whether a given punishment is 
 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 
118 See supra note 78. 
119 Id.  
120 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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“substantially rejected by contemporary society.”121 Courts are also ca-
pable of evaluating the extent of public deliberation surrounding a par-
ticular issue. For example, the Court engaged in such an assessment 
when it found state bans on same-sex marriage to violate the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
[T]here has been far more deliberation than [the lower 
court] acknowledges. There have been referenda, legis-
lative debates, and grassroots campaigns, as well as 
countless studies, papers, books, and other popular and 
scholarly writings. There has been extensive litigation in 
state and federal courts. … Judicial opinions addressing 
the issue have been informed by the contentions of par-
ties and counsel, which, in turn, reflect the more general, 
societal discussion of same-sex marriage and its meaning 
that has occurred over the past decades.122 
When engaged in such political power inquiry, judges would not 
need to dig deep. If too much investigatory work were required, this 
would be a sign that the concern raised by the objector has not played a 
visible role in political discourse. Importantly, since the Political Power 
Factor is just that—a factor—it would not be outcome-determinative. 
Circumstances unrelated to political power could outweigh the factor. 
However, the Political Power Factor can function as an additional con-
sideration that courts can engage in to ensure that the exemptions 
granted are not at odds with the central tenets of democratic governance 
that underpin the mandates of the Establishment Clause. 
IV. CONCERNS EVOKED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF A POLITICAL 
POWER FACTOR 
A. Indeterminacy in the Political Power Factor’s Application 
It can be hard to determine (without getting into religious ques-
tions) whether a religious objector is part of a subgroup that does not 
have the power of the religious grouping in general. However, this ques-
tion would never arise in religious exemption adjudication. Religious 
exemption adjudication focuses on the belief or practice in conflict with 
 
121 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972). Thank you to Chris Logel for making 
this connection. 
122 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 676 (2015). 
JØNCH-CLAUSEN 
2021] BETWEEN ACCOMMODATION & FAVORITISM 67 
the law in question—not the religious group or individual.123 It is en-
tirely possible for an objector to be a member of a political group that 
has little political power, and yet for this objector to seek exemption on 
the basis of a belief or view that has been backed by political power in 
democratic deliberation. The view in question could have support by 
other powerful groups in society. One could imagine that the objectors 
in Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop belonged to small evangel-
ical Christian subgroups with unique identities or belief-sets—or that 
they belonged to completely unfamiliar religious sects. Under such sce-
narios, the views upon which they based their exemption claims would 
still be backed by political power. The objection to same-sex marriage 
and to certain contraceptives would be backed by the political power of 
other religious and non-religious groups and as such would have had a 
fair chance of influencing politics.124 In these cases, it is thus important 
to note that evangelical Christians have had—and still have—a strong 
voice in politics on the views in question.125 Whether or not the objectors 
actually affiliate themselves with particular evangelical Christian 
groupings is not important.   
Another challenge for the Political Power Factor would, for ex-
ample, be the case where the religious belief in question falls some-
where in the middle of the scale, i.e., it is not immediately clear whether 
it is backed by political power or not.  In those situations, the Political 
Power Factor will (obviously) not be of much help in determining the 
outcome of a burden analysis. However, it is precisely this kind of situ-
ation in which the problems associated with political power will be less 
urgent.  
B. Reconciling the Political Power Factor with Competing 
Justifications for Religious Exemptions  
Those who believe that religious exemptions are justified pri-
marily because they protect politically vulnerable minorities have obvi-
ous grounds to endorse the Political Power Factor.  The factor weighs 
 
123 For an overview of this feature of religious exemption adjudication, see Eugene Volokh, 
The Individualistic American Law of Religious Exemptions, WASH. POST, (Jan. 19, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/19/the-individualistic-
american-law-of-religious-exemptions/. 
124 See id. (“The right to a religious exemption belongs to a particular religious believer be-
cause of his religious beliefs, whatever they might be. The right does not belong to a religious 
group (setting aside certain religious associational rights that are not relevant here), nor does it 
belong to a person by virtue of his membership in a group”). 
125 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723-24 
(2018); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014). 
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in favor of views that are not backed by political power. While the reli-
gious views at stake in exemption cases like Hobby Lobby and Master-
piece Cakeshop reflect concern for “minorities” in the sense that they 
are based on the views of the losing side of the democratic deliberation 
that preceded the law from which the exemption is sought, they cannot 
easily be argued to protect the politically vulnerable.126 The Political 
Power Factor would weigh against the objectors claims in these cases 
because the objectors sought exemptions on the basis of viewpoint al-
ready well-represented in democratic deliberation.  
Protecting the politically vulnerable is, however, not the only 
justification for religious exemptions. Another justification arises from 
the view that religious beliefs are special in a way that sets them apart 
from other moral or deeply held convictions (or practices). 127  Those 
who believe religious exemptions are justified primarily on the basis 
that religion is special may not be too worried about political power. 
After all, from this perspective it is the nature of the belief that justifies 
the exemption—not the extent to which the belief is represented in pol-
itics.128 Significant literature exists on the topic of religion’s specialness 
or lack thereof.129 This Article remains agnostic on the issue of the spe-
cialness of religion and how the specialness rationale is weighed against 
the rationale that familiar or unpopular religious beliefs must be pro-
tected. It does assume that the protection of vulnerable minorities is a 
 
126 Reva Siegel and Douglas NeJaime have eloquently described some of the tensions and 
opportunities for manipulation that evolve around the majority–minority status in religious ex-
emptions. See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 4, at 2520–21 (“Those seeking to preserve tradi-
tional norms governing sex, reproduction, and marriage may speak as a majority endeavoring 
to defend or enact laws that enforce community-wide customary norms—or, without change in 
numbers, they may speak as minorities endeavoring to avoid complicity when law departs from 
those norms.”). 
127 BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 54–67 (2012); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER AND 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 51–77 (2007); Christopher 
C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 488, 490–92 (2017); Alan E. Brown-
stein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigor-
ously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger When Both 
Clauses are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2011). 
128 See e.g. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1409, 1498–1500 (1990). 
. 
129 See, e.g., LEITER, supra note 128, AT 54–67; CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER AND LAWRENCE 
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 51–77 (2007); Christopher C. Lund, 
Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. (2017); Alan E. Brownstein, The Religion Clauses 
as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Ex-
ercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger When Both Clauses are Taken Seriously, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2011). 
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rationale (one amongst many) for allowing religious exemptions.130 This 
assumption should not be controversial. Furthermore, it should be clear 
at this point that any system of accommodation that rests too much on 
the specialness of religion will rest uneasily with the Establishment 
Clause. 
The abovementioned justifications for religious exemptions are 
not mutually exclusive and religious exemptions are often granted on 
grounds that draw on both.131  While the weight given to various justifi-
cations for religious exemption will affect the Political Power Factor, 
no justification should render it useless. Giving more weight to the spe-
cialness of religion merely suggests that from this perspective, the Po-
litical Power Factor will likely be less weighty.  
C. Applying the Political Power Factor within the Boundaries of 
the Religious Question Doctrine 
This Article conjectures that a reason we may not see courts en-
gage—at least explicitly—in the evaluation of the political power of re-
ligious views is the courts’ concern with inappropriate trespassing into 
religious question territory. While the “hands off” religion/Religious 
Question Doctrine serves important functions, it is also important to en-
sure that the doctrine not operate beyond the boundaries of its justifica-
tions. When the Religious Question Doctrine operates within the bound-
aries of its justifications, it does not bar the inquiry set forth by the 
Political Power Factor. Courts can make determinations about the dem-
ocratic status of religious claims without getting entangled in religious 
subject matter. Courts can, for example, recognize an objection to same-
sex marriage as a position that is mainstream within public political cul-
ture without involving themselves in religious teachings on the pur-
ported sin of such an act. Similarly, courts can recognize the religious 
requirement of wearing a beard, using peyote, or not working on Satur-
days as minority viewpoints vulnerable in ordinary political processes.  
 
130 The view that religion should be protected on the basis of religion’s specialness alone is 
not completely divorced from concerns for democracy. However, the democracy concern at 
stake seems to be of a different nature. One may, for example, argue that religious believers may 
reasonably believe that their obligations toward a deity precede obligations toward their fellow 
members of democratic society and providing these citizens with exemptions can ease this ten-
sion between divine and democratic obligations and as such be justified in the sense that such 
accommodation provides stability. 
131 While religious exemption will often be justified by both rationales, the different weighting 
of these justifications is nonetheless very divisive. For a discussion of these competing justifi-
cations see, e.g., William P. Marshall, Extricating the Religious Exemption Debate from the 
Culture Wars, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 67–77 (2018).  
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It is imaginable that a question could arise as to whether the re-
ligious viewpoint at stake in the exemption case and the viewpoint fa-
miliar from democratic discourse aligns. Even here, the Religious Ques-
tion Doctrine does not bar inquiry. To adjudicate a religious exemption 
claim, a court must be able to understand what viewpoint, way of life or 
practice is being offended by the law in question. Courts can gain such 
understanding without delving into the theological underpinning of the 
view or practice and without deciding any religious questions or evalu-
ating the merit of religious claims. When they do so, they engage in 
second-order questions about religion rather than first-order questions 
within religion.132 It is, for example, easy to see that viewpoints that 
align with the needs of religious objectors who are opposed to same-sex 
marriage are already well-represented in democratic discourse.133 The 
status of the opposition to same sex marriage in political processes can 
be evaluated without getting into any religious texts, teachings, or prin-
ciples. 
When determining whether the Political Power Factor offends 
the Religious Question Doctrine, difficulties and borderline cases would 
undoubtedly arise. Yet difficult boundary drawing is already inherent in 
the task of adjudicating religious exemption claims. In a certain sense 
the Political Power Factor makes explicit considerations that may lurk 
underneath the surface in religious exemption adjudication. It provides 
a tool for engaging in explicit and careful Establishment Clause analy-
sis, a tool that should facilitate the difficult boundary-drawing at stake.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Cases like Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop are at the 
heart of a controversy over religious exemptions, and they have spurred 
heated debates in the courts, academic literature, and in public political 
culture more generally.134 To the extent possible, this Article sets aside 
much debated and important issues related to discrimination and third-
party harm and focuses on political power.135 Without rejecting the need 
 
132 For more in depth-discussions of “second-order” questions about religion that courts can 
unproblematically engage in, see Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking the Religious Question Doc-
trine, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1013, 1016 (2013) (Second-order questions are temporal and empirical 
questions-sociological questions about the beliefs or structure of a religious group, psychologi-
cal questions about the religious beliefs and motivations of individual believers, and so on.) See 
also Goldstein, supra note 100 at 502–03. 
133 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
134 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
135 See supra Sections I.A., II.A., IV.A., IV.B. 
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for more radical change, the Article offers a modest proposal that could 
be implemented within the contours of the current religious exemption 
regime.136 The proposed Political Power Factor provides an opportunity 
to address the democratic and constitutional challenges that arise when 
objectors seek exemptions on the basis of views already well-repre-
sented in democratic deliberation.137 It is not a flawless principle, but 
merely a factor, which means that it can adjust to complicated circum-
stances surrounding religious exemption claims.138 The Political Power 
Factor can be used in combination with other factors to reach less con-
troversial and constitutionally suspect outcomes in religious exemption 
adjudication.139  The Political Power Factor sets forth a line of inquiry 
that courts can engage in without offending the Religious Question Doc-
trine.140 It thereby provides a tool for careful courts engaged in the dif-
ficult boundary-drawing between Free exercise claims and the Estab-
lishment Clause challenges.141 While this Article makes initial gestures 
at how a Political Power Factor would operate in adjudication, its pur-




136 See supra Section III. 
137 See supra Section III. 
138 See supra Section III. 
139 See supra Section IV. 
140 See supra Section IV. 
141 See supra Section IV. 
